http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin
Unfortunately my article didn't get publish, but here it is nonetheless:
Pakistan is in danger – not because of its political instability, but because of misguided foreign policy suggestions. Vanni Cappelli’s proposals to curtail the Islamic threat in Pakistan in the January 6th edition of the San Francisco Chronicle are a repetition of history. Blaming Pakistan’s army for the extremist Islamic threat the world faces only distracts policy-making from effective changes needed to promote stability within the country.
What is most frightening about Cappelli’s argument is suggesting an Afghanistan-India-US alliance to try to contain extremism in Pakistan. There are two major problems with this solution: first, it completely dismisses the dangers and repercussions of utilizing Afghanistan and India, the two states that Pakistan finds dangerous to its statehood; and second, the proposal suggests that the Pakistani state is inherently linked with Islamic extremism, a falsehood that should not be linked to US foreign policy.
In regards to the first issue, the hurried process of partition left Pakistan and India’s borders fragile, and the Kashmir issue unresolved. The result has been massive military and defense spending on both sides. Pakistan spent $4,572 million and India spent $23,933 million in 2006 alone in military expenditure. This includes money for weapons that could be spent on educating thousands of children in both countries. Trying to contain Pakistan through India would only exacerbate the threat India poses for the state-hood of Pakistan. Disputes between the two countries remain unresolved, and it is inevitable that Pakistan would continue to spend more on defense and the military to protect its borders. If the goal of development in Pakistan is to provide “tractors, not tanks” to its citizens, then this policy needs to be rethought. Using Afghanistan would similarly only worsen tension between the two countries who are currently trying to contain the open and ungoverned regions on the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Eradicating internal Islamic threats to Pakistan and other countries requires working with the country, not isolating it.
Second, it’s a mistake to assume that the US’s focus should now be shifted from Iraq to Pakistan. There is a looming threat of instability and destruction in Iraq that should not be ignored. Clearly, if the U.S. is having difficult in curtailing extremists in Iraq, then there is no reason to assume that Pakistan can succeed in the task but just hasn’t been doing so. Pakistan’s military history has been extensive, but civilian rule in the country has not proven to produce stability and prosperity either. Violation of human rights for women and minorities are integrated into a corrupt political system; it is not a result of an Islamic identity, but because of a continuously tension-filled political history. Even when Benazir Bhutto was in power, she was not successful in curtailing violations of rights for women, or in liberalizing the media. The Pakistani military’s goals are problematic, but when faced with threats from countries that continually endanger its political and cultural autonomy, the military finds more reasons to further assert Pakistani identity that “needs” to be different from its neighbors – an Islamic one.
Policies toward stability will be effective in Pakistan if the U.S. focuses not on an anti-Islam agenda, but political development within the country. Moreover, media should not continue to paint a rosy picture of the Bhutto legacy in Pakistan – democratic process in Pakistan requires substantial change, not a lineage of political leaders.
Pakistan is not a lost cause. The lawyers’ movement and the subsequent return of Bhutto are indicators that Pakistanis are demanding rights and political freedom. Pakistan’s history and political sphere is more complex than an Islam vs. West attitude: let’s try to comprehend that before we propose plans to eradicate the extremist threat coming from the country.
